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New challenges for Brazilian civil society actors within 
the changing context of international cooperation1
Kees Biekart2
The research conducted by the FGV about international cooperation and the architecture of funding 
for Brazilian Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) (CEAPG & ARTICULAÇÃO D3, 2013) generated 
significant results. These provide us with a better understanding about the national and global changes that 
have rapidly affected the development of civil society organizations in Brazil. The results broadly confirm 
the findings of research conducted a few years ago into changes, over past decades, in the direction of non-
government aid flows within Latin America (BIEKART, 2005). We should note that, compared to its neigh-
bouring countries, since the 1980s, Brazil has been recognized as the country that receives the most funding 
from all the private European aid agencies, followed (at some distance), by Peru (and, after 2002, by Bolivia). 
This finding serves to support the belief that the current retraction of international non-government aid 
flows to Brazil is actually a relatively recent phenomenon.
This chapter intends to comment on the results of research about “international cooperation”, primarily by 
providing a brief overview of the changing international context within which such results should be ana-
(1) In the Portuguese version of this book this chapter was translated form the English by Prof. Dr. Elizabeth Reis Teixeira.
(2) The author would like to thank all the participants of the April 2013 Seminar in São Paulo, as well as Rui Mesquita Cordeiro and Patricia Mendonça, 
for their timely comments when reviewing this work.
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lysed. For a better understanding of the global context, we will identify a series of current trends in debates 
about global policy and international cooperation. These developments also have implications for interna-
tional donor NGOs, which we will discuss in the second part of the chapter. The third section explores the 
implications for Brazilian civil society organizations and considers how this so-called “retraction” affects 
future prospects. Finally, we present some suggestions about the potential future challenges for Brazilian 
civil society organizations within their current context.
We would like to start by providing a more general commentary regarding one of the central problems 
encountered by the researchers: the difficulty of finding reliable data about the flow of non-government 
aid. It is true that official flows of aid are generally well documented, for example, in statistics from the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment (OECD) at the Development Centre in Paris. The efficiency and reliability of this data set is 
surprising, given its age, and the fact that it is frequently aggregated. We have only estimated aid flows 
aggregated to NGOs, since there are no authorized centres for the control of NGO statistics. We will 
provide two examples from previous years: the level of non-government aid flows and the total number 
of NGOs.
The total flow of aid to NGOs rose from 4 billion US dollars in 1989 to 10 billion in 1998 and 23 
billion in 2004 (in other words from 5% to 12%, and then to almost 33% of total official development 
assistance or ODA) (RIDDELL, 2007). However, these estimated totals are based on gross figures from 
the OECD, combined with figures from the coordination agencies of national NGOs. These percentages 
remain quite problematic, given that ODA fell after the middle of the 1990s and then rose again in the 
2000s and we advise extreme caution in interpretation. The second example of the estimated total number 
of NGOs is also very difficult to establish. Firstly, there is no consensus about what we understand to be 
an NGO: should unions, cooperatives and other associative organizations be included? Do we consider a 
wider group of non-profit organizations, or even the confusing category of Civil Society Organizations 
(CSOs)3? While UN estimates in 2000 accounted for approximately 35,000 NGOs, we would venture 
that the number of (relevant) international donors is between 800 and 1,000, of which only 150-180 have 
(3) The term CSO – also frequently used in this study – is quite problematic, in part because the term “civil society” has not been clearly defined, but also 
because it is generalized to refer to highly varied organizations. If we defined civil society as “all the interested organizations between the state and the family 
(the private sphere), which are autonomous in relation to the state and generated voluntarily to serve and promote the interest of their members”, this would 
provide something quite different from the generally accepted definition of an NGO (“a non-profit organization, not owned by its members, providing 
development services for the poor and marginalized”) (BIEKART, 1999: 40). However, we agree that the term “Third Sector” is even less appropriate.
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played an internationally important role over the last two decades. In fact, the word “relevant” is crucial 
here, given that we also know of a great many small activities conducted by private transnational donors.
The researchers approached NGOs in the Global North via e-mail, in order to request information, after 
navigating their websites (and frequently not finding the required information). In fact, international NGOs 
in the area of development did not provide many responses and/or were not very transparent. Should a re-
searcher wish to obtain more detailed information about their budgets, the number of partner organizations, 
priority policies or views about changes, they need to knock on doors and ask directly. In our experience 
(when conducting a summary of changes to aid flows in Latin America in the middle of the 2000s), a great 
deal of valid and reliable information may be generated through this approach (BIEKART, 2005). Further, 
such an approach has recently become easier, since most NGOs in the Global North are moving their offices 
to the Global South, facilitating accessibility by local researchers.
Trends within the international cooperation context
It is evident that the global socio-economic context of 2013 is characterized by an increasingly polarized 
world in which the economic growth of many Asian and emerging economies is taking place alongside eco-
nomic stagnation and crisis in the “old world”, particularly in Europe (specifically in the south). This has put 
pressure on the international monetary and financial infrastructure. Furthermore, we face limitations in our 
ecological and social systems: we are using more natural resources than the planet is capable of generating, 
while two billion people live on less than two dollars a day. In other words, we are exploiting the world, yet 
a considerable portion of the global population does not benefit from its surplus. Added to this, the growth 
of the global population has accelerated, due to a combination of increased life expectancy combined with a 
decline in fertility rates, expected to result in 9 billion inhabitants on Planet Earth by 2050 (KANBUR and 
SUMNER, 2012).
These changes to the international scene have been reflected in international cooperation practices – 
which have clearly also affected civil society organizations in both the Global North and South. Below we 
present a brief outline of the identified trends:
– Economic change towards “new” or emerging economies
Besides economic growth, BRIC countries have also experienced a relative reduction in their share of 
ODA compared to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and remittances. However, this varies by country: many 
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of the poorer countries still depend heavily on ODA – in 10% of the lowest income countries, ODA still 
represents 20% or more of GDP. However, remittances from immigrants from the South to countries in the 
South have also grown, and represent half of the total flow of remittances (UNDP 2013:15).
– Changes in poverty condition, from low-income country to middle-income country
 (BRICS – Brazil, Russia, China, India and South Africa)
Contrary to expectations, poverty has, in fact, become a more pressing problem in middle-income 
countries. Over the last 15 years, more than 75% of the world’s poor have begun to live in middle-income 
countries, principally in emerging economies such as India (34%), China (15%) and other BRICS (Nige-
ria, Indonesia, Pakistan and the Philippines). Kanbur and Sumner (2012) estimate that between 800-950 
million people, the “new bottom billion”, are primarily located in these BRICS, with the remaining 25% 
(between 300-350 million) distributed across 35 low-income countries, mostly in Bangladesh, the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania and Ethiopia.
– Growth in inequality in BRIC countries
Economic growth is associated with decline in both health and education inequalities, but an increase in 
income inequality, although differences between countries may also be observed. In Latin America over the 
last decade, inequality has become a more significant policy matter and has consequently grown more slowly 
(although it remains significant). As a consequence of this, BRIC country governments have been under 
pressure to institute measures against the growth of income inequality.
– The crisis in Global Public Goods requires an integrated approach
Many global problems can only be dealt with outside the national context. Problems such as climate 
change, financial instability and the exhaustion of natural resources are undermining efforts to reduce pov-
erty and achieve social equity, since they affect the world’s poorest. These are very closely linked to standards 
of consumption, food prices and demographic growth and therefore require changes to standards of con-
sumption and production, central to the post-2015 agenda.
– New forms of international cooperation with many new actors emerging
The BRIC countries are emerging as new donors (“in the network”), particularly in South-South 
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cooperation. Over the last decade, most BRIC countries (China, India and Brazil) have evolved from 
recipients of the international cooperation network (including in food aid) to donors. They have also en-
dorsed the “Busan principles” for Effective Development Cooperation, although this occurred voluntarily 
in order to deal with domestic challenges. As the BRICs have grown in importance, the G20 has also 
become a more prominent participant on the global scene. Nevertheless, funds from BRIC donations 
remain limited, at an estimated annual 1.8 billion dollars – relatively small compared to the 133.5 billion 
US dollars in ODA (2012) for OECD countries. Moreover, although the BRICs remain unrepresented in 
the Bretton Woods institutions and at the United Nations, this is beginning to change. Within the BRIC 
countries, other international actors, such as private foundations, local businesses and bilateral civil initia-
tives have also assumed new formats through new standards.
– Traditional OECD donors are losing their prominent role
Despite the large share of the total flow of international DAC-OECD aid, bilateral programmes are in-
creasingly stagnant and under pressure, particularly in traditional donor countries, such as Canada, Germany, 
Holland, Denmark, Sweden and Norway. More prominence is given to supporting a variety of multilateral 
projects and providing incentives to the private sector, particularly to open up new markets. NGOs from the 
Global North (the “bilateral civil channel”) in particular have been left with the role of working with fragile 
states and emerging economies.
– The importance of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) for Development (ICT4D)
Between 2000 and 2010, internet use grew by 30% in all 60 developing countries, with Brazil, the Russian 
Federation and China demonstrating the most spectacular growth (UNDP, 2013: 50). In addition, the Arab 
revolutions accentuated the importance of social media within change processes. ICT4D is therefore seen 
as an instrument able to rapidly expose the existence of inequality and disempowerment. ICT4D also facili-
tates North-South and South-South cooperation in education and research, where “open access” and “open 
data” can be key instruments in overcoming monopolies dominated by large institutions based in the North.
The transformation of private international “solidarity” agencies
The implications of these trends for non-government donor agencies from the North and their (tradi-
tional) partners in the South are quite diverse, as we shall see below. The categories “North” and “South” are 
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inherently inadequate, since differing development cases influence one another. We would also distance 
ourselves from the idea of a rich “Global North” and a poor and marginalized “Global South”. Instead, 
what is emerging is a series of countries that were recipients of Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
but have rapidly become middle-income. These have now become donors both to “developing countries” 
and (via their governments) to social development organizations within their own societies. Policies and 
activities by NGO donors from the North (or private international aid agencies) have experienced quite 
dramatic changes over the last decade. Since these processes are complex and inter-related, we need to 
dissect them carefully.
The first change is a gradual one in the composition of funds from donors. Many private international 
aid agencies started out with private donations and these still represent an important share of their revenue 
as a whole (see BIEKART, 1999). During the golden age of international cooperation in the 1980s and 
90s, agency budgets increased significantly through government subsidies, frequently as part of high 
ODA allocations and strong International Cooperation ministries, but also through the larger budgets of 
NGOs from the European Union. In Northern Europe (the United Kingdom, Holland, Belgium, Nor-
way, Sweden, Denmark and Finland), allocations to intermediary NGOs reached their high point at the 
end of the century, followed by an overall decline at the beginning of the new decade. The same process 
took place in Southern Europe some years later; this region was thus particularly affected by the onset 
of the financial crisis in 2007-8. With the decline in official international aid investment, new funding 
avenues were explored. These grew, in part, out of the emergence of populist lotteries (see FOWLER, 
2011), as well as through new fundraising campaigns following the international humanitarian emergen-
cies in the African Great Lakes, Haiti and Southern Asia (in the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami). Cam-
paign messages were generally populist in nature, and there was a gradual sense of the de-politicization 
of non-government donor aid. This translated into a shift from values based on solidarity towards values 
focused on charity.
A second reversal relates to the allocation of aid flows from international NGOs. In the past decade, 
there has been a gradual withdrawal of donor NGOs from middle-income countries, particularly in Latin 
America (see BIEKART, 2005). Over recent years, donors have tended to classify recipient countries ac-
cording to various categories. The most recent Dutch international cooperation policy, for example, dis-
tinguishes between four different areas of non-government aid to recipients in the South: (i) low income 
countries, where the focus is on poverty reduction and traditional service provision programmes; (ii) 
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fragile states, where the focus is on the establishment of peace and human rights conflicts; (iii) middle-
income countries, with a focus on income distribution and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR); and 
(iv) more global programmes focused on advocacy, which deal with climate change, natural resources and 
financial instability. For Brazil, this obviously involves paying less heed to the flows of traditional interna-
tional aid from NGOs, since their focus is now on the first two categories. This does not necessarily mean 
that all donor NGOs have withdrawn from Brazil, as we will explain later, since a series of new organiza-
tions have begun to initiate activities here.
A third repositioning involves a (lack of ) accountability or responsibility amongst private international 
aid agencies. In the past, this was not a major issue, but as the agencies grew and criticisms of official 
agencies intensified, private international aid agencies also came under the spotlight. From the 1990s on-
wards, the results and impact of private international aid agencies (which, in fact, were largely financed by 
public funds) began to be inspected (see BIEKART, 1999; JORDAN and VAN TUIJL, 2006). Politicians, 
journalists and public servants believe that private international aid agencies must demonstrate greater 
responsibility, specifically through a more detailed demonstration of the results they achieve. This saw the 
beginning of a wave of results-based monitoring, which came about through the need to demonstrate 
aid effectiveness. Log frames and staff training in PME (planning, monitoring and evaluation) were in-
troduced. One disadvantage of these developments was a fixation on short-term results and less concern 
about more long-term ones, which are likely to be more sustainable.
A fourth change to non-government agencies involved in international cooperation can been observed 
in growing competition between the international development actors who have since emerged on the 
global stage, such as citizen initiatives and corporate foundations. Smaller initiatives on the part of citizens, 
often as a result of personal relationships established during trips or through professional networking, are 
generally considered by donor NGOs to be complementary activities. Some NGOs may advise such initia-
tives or facilitate contact and local support, in order, for example, to set up a primary school or community 
health centre. On the other hand, some observers have been critical of private citizen initiatives, accusing 
them of a lack of professionalism and of negatively affecting the image of international cooperation in its 
country of origin (see KINSBERGEN and SCHULPEN, 2009). Another new competitor comes from the 
private sector, in the form of a new generation of corporate foundations: small and local foundations that 
operate in health and education, and larger foundations, such as the Bill Gates Foundation. Such founda-
tions have also become more active in Brazil; this is examined in greater detail in another chapter.
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A fifth point relates to the changes that have taken place in the internal organization of a number of 
private aid agencies over recent years. This has occurred in response to the persistent demands of new donors 
for greater effectiveness and more tangible results. All these changes within “solidarity agencies” from the 
North have profoundly affected relationships with “partners in the South”:
• Due to a reduction in government subsidies to private international aid agencies, a greater share of 
funds now derives from the “charity market”, leading to short-term populist strategies;
• Agencies have begun to decentralize their operations and organizations aimed at the South and, for 
reasons of efficiency, have increasingly begun to contract more local teams, while terminating the work 
contracts of teams from the North;
• The largest private international aid agencies (such as Oxfam, CARE, Save the Children and World 
Vision) are increasingly organized transnationally, in order to maximize fundraising based in the South 
(especially in the BRIC countries) and centralize global advocacy activities;
• Due to technocratic influences, an “accountancy culture” predominates, in which short-term tangible 
results are preferable to long-term, less tangible, but more significant, ones.
Overall, these trends have contributed to the de-politicization of the agendas of many NGOs from the 
North and this seems to have affected Brazilian partners (generally, more politically oriented) in a negative 
way, as we shall see below. Support from international cooperation to a number of Brazilian NGOs termi-
nated (after decades of intense partnership) in the middle of the 2000s, while existing funds, for example 
those aimed at rights activities, have been reallocated to activities guided by the market, corporate social 
responsibility and environmental issues.
As a consequence of these trends, NGOs from the North have been confronted by a series of crucial 
choices. If they want to survive as private donor agencies, they have to invest more in raising public funds 
(which many already do), although they increasingly compete for the same funds with their partners in the 
South. Furthermore, they have to acquire the technical capability for quantification and evaluation. Another 
option is to reject this de-politicization and pursue other alternatives. Agencies such as Action Aid, Hivos 
and those that are more campaign-oriented (such as the Clean Clothes Campaign) prefer to extend their 
agendas towards generating transformative changes. Their focus has moved from an emphasis on service 
provision and sub-contracting for the implementation of cooperation policies to the exploration of new ap-
proaches, such as knowledge generation or training a support base in how to deal with global public issues 
within their countries of origin. The Dutch agency Hivos, for example, is now engaged with new develop-
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ment actors, such as hackers, member of the digital generation and other activists, in order to explore new 
forms of global citizen action. Instead of establishing “projects”, the new role of the agency is to develop 
partners and “exploratory laboratories” focused on knowledge exchange and the development of new visions 
for the future of international cooperation4. This work is chiefly funded by a broad spectrum of private sector 
foundations based in the USA, as well as by the Dutch government.
Implications for civil society recipients in the South (e.g. in Brazil)
The implications for partner organizations in the South and, by extension, for Brazilian partners, are 
quite drastic. After all, for more than two decades partnerships between international solidarity cooperation 
agencies were crucial to maintaining a political agenda focused on advocacy policy, rights-based approaches 
and training. This “golden age” has come to an end and it is unclear who will now take on the responsibility 
for funding such activities.
Before we enter into this question further, however, we should stress that international support (particu-
larly from Europe and Canada) to Brazilian NGOs (largely linked to political opposition) was a critical ele-
ment in the 1980s and 90s and contributed to fundamental political changes in the years that followed (see 
WILS and SCHUURMAN, 1991; LANDIM 1997; DAGNINO, 2008). This came about because of the 
relatively peaceful end to the military regime, the approval of the new Constitution and the electoral period 
that eventually led to the Lula presidency.
Compared to similar NGOs in other Latin American countries, what Brazilian NGOs did particularly 
well was to provide critical support to transformative social movements, which formed the basis for socio-
political change in the new millennium. One key example is the organization of several, highly successful, 
“World Social Forums” in Porto Alegre. The relationship between these movements and NGOs is not 
straightforward, since they also created a great deal of tension, particularly in relation to the legitimacy of 
Brazilian NGOs “representing” such movements (DAGNINO, 2008; THAYER, 2010). Equally, a number 
of lessons were learnt about how to support social movements without creating dependency on external 
funds. From the 1990s onwards, this matter was also discussed in several Dutch documents about inter-
national aid policies (see WILS, 1999; DE KADT, 1997). The most important point, however, was that 
(4) For information about this knowledge programme see the Hivos website: <http://www.hivos.net/Hivos-Knowledge-Programme/Themes/Civic-
Explorations>.
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Brazilian NGOs had a new role in relation to these movements, something also addressed by Dagnino 
(2008). The new context of international aid required a new policy agenda, as well as new forms of funding, 
although frequently the NGOs themselves categorically denied this, since they were unable to see that the 
political scenario was fundamentally different to the one 15 years earlier.
It came as a shock for many Brazilian NGOs to learn that the entire spectrum of private international 
aid agencies (from Oxfam to Christian Aid; from Bread for the World to the ICCO) had decided to 
“withdraw” their support to long-term Brazilian partner organizations. The partner agencies perceived 
this “withdrawal” as weakening the international solidarity relationship, yet for the international agen-
cies this was a logical movement towards new political priorities. As some of the ICCO project agents 
expressed it:
It is no longer power (based on a strong relationship with the ICCO and other donors) 
that will be important, but their ability to influence other stakeholders in the change 
process. This transformation from dependence on power to active influencer is a pro-
found change, which has generated insecurity and resistance amongst certain partners 
(DERKSEN and VERHALLEN, 2008, p. 237).
It seems that a strong bond was established over the years, and breaking this bond was not easy for either 
party. The end of the FASE-ICCO relationship generated a wide-ranging discussion, about which we made 
the following comments:
[...] at a certain point, there is probably a natural end to any partnership. Sometimes, this 
comes about after a decade, or as is the case of FASE, after many decades. It is clear from 
their emotional reactions that both partners considered the partnership to have absolute 
importance, which is accentuated by the levels of energy, transparency and innovation 
they invested. However, despite the various stages of “reinvention”, the two parties have 
been incapable of extricating themselves from a certain, fundamental logic. We believe 
that this refers to an internal (and probably quite comfortable) standard implicit in all 
donor-recipient relationships, which becomes unstable as soon as funds are no longer the 
driving force (BIEKART, 2009).
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What became clear was that both the donor and the recipient were paralysed by the relationship; both 
were incapable of handling the changing situation.
As previously discussed, the end of such partnerships is part of a wider trend whereby many Canadian 
and European solidarity aid agencies have decided to reduce, or even totally close, their aid programmes in 
Latin America. This trend for the “withdrawal” of European agencies had been feared for a decade, but it 
actually materialized much more slowly than expected. In fact, instead of an effective withdrawal, what has 
occurred is a reorientation to other countries and sectors (BIEKART, 2005). However, the speed with which 
this process has been recently implemented has led to concerns across the entire Latin American region: will 
programmes in poorer countries, such as Bolivia, Honduras and Haiti, also be “deactivated”? The fact that 
many partners were surprised by this “withdrawal”, has also raised concerns that new forms of “civilateral” 
international cooperation are probably not emerging automatically.
This points to an interesting question that has emerged from the current discussion: why are Brazilian 
(and Latin American) NGOs not more active in the field of international advocacy? The social movements 
(such as, for example, the Landless Workers Movement – Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra: MST, 
and Unified Workers’ Central – Central Única dos Trabalhadores: CUT, etc.) are truly active at global level, 
yet Brazilian political NGOs appear to have ceased global expansion at the World Social Forum and in 
ABONG activities within the ALOP (the Latin American NGO Network). Why is there such a modest 
Brazilian NGO presence in global campaigns and political advocacy networks? This matter requires a more 
in-depth discussion, given that there are many opportunities for the development of a joint Euro-Latin-
American agenda for international cooperation “beyond dependency aid”, for example. New international 
funding to support a more international role for experienced Brazilian civil actors is certainly available (as 
evidenced by NGOs in India, the Philippines, and South Africa), which leads us to the following question: 
are they really interested in getting involved?
Meanwhile, at a global level, changes are occurring to the way that the urgency of development aid 
is perceived; furthermore, in certain countries drastic changes are taking place. For example, the gradual 
imposition to demonstrate “visible results” (and frequently short-term ones) through the structural pro-
cess of long-term change (which is practically impossible) has strongly influenced the strategies adopted 
by international solidarity agencies. Brazilian NGOs criticized this position twenty years ago, when 
they discovered that agencies in the North were not resolute in combating such pressure, although, at 
the time, private international aid was still in its heyday (see POELHEKKE, 1996). It is therefore cru-
92
cially important that Brazilian “partners” demonstrate more specifically the results they have attained 
over these thirty years. If we accept that structural changes occur slowly, we must also visualize how, 
and to what extent, – after decades of supporting social organization for the excluded – a new genera-
tion of effective social and political leaders will emerge. If Brazilian NGOs (as well as their donors) do 
not manage to demonstrate the relationship between their efforts and the results they attain, it will be 
very difficult to counter the neoliberal prophets of the “cooperation industry”, who continue to press for 
short-term tangible products.
This, often antagonistic, ending to the solidarity partnerships of Brazilian NGOs is, in some ways, a 
little surprising. After all, as we have described above, over this period Brazil has experienced spectacular 
economic growth compared to other Latin American countries. We would therefore expect much more fa-
vourable conditions for the development of new forms of international partnerships, no longer based on the 
transfer of funds, but rather supported by mutual learning, knowledge generation and transnational advocacy 
strategies. One could question, therefore, whether the end of solidarity partnerships was really so dramatic. 
After all, opening new avenues and allowing new opportunities to emerge may lead to new encounters and 
partnerships.
The challenge in the short term is to adjust to a new situation, in which Brazilian NGOs press 
for, and design, their own co-funding system and thus possibly (but not necessarily) incorporate les-
sons learnt from Europe. This new co-funding system will have to be funded partially by the Brazilian 
government and partially by funds from other sources, with funding raised by Brazilian NGOs from a 
variety of international donors and corporate foundations, as well as from other local sources (as sug-
gested by other studies in this volume). The greatest challenge, in our opinion, is to prevent Brazilian 
NGOs from repeating the same mistakes as their solidarity partners from the North, who ended up 
committing to a co-funding system which almost strangled them at birth. There are valuable lessons to 
be learnt in terms of governance, accountability and fundraising, as well as more political and strategic 
lessons related to the construction of coalitions and advocacy campaigns. However, Brazilian NGOs 
should also focus on transnational South-South cooperation, systematizing the lessons learnt from 
Latin American (and/or Brazilian) efforts to deliver successful activities that combat exclusion and 
disempowerment. These lessons are still not accessible to African actors or other social transformation 
agents, since many evaluations and studies are not designed to incorporate such analyses. However, 
given that many former members of Brazilian NGO teams are now participating in evaluations of in-
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ternational aid interventions in Africa, the systematization of such lessons and a guarantee that they are 
used to improve South-South cooperation should not be a complex matter.
Challenges for Brazilian civil society actors
All these trends have had an impact on the position of Brazil within the international donor com-
munity, as well as in relation to Brazilian civil society actors who previously depended on international 
aid. The FGV-Articulação D3 research project encountered numerous Brazilian confirmations of the 
above-mentioned trends, such as a drastic reduction in flows of solidarity aid; a trend to support Brazilian 
organizations in becoming more financially sustainable; the trend that reveals limited private sector re-
sources to support more “politicized” civil society organizations; and the lack of a clear government policy 
to fund groups that operate in the defence of civil rights. These findings demonstrate the need to explore 
new pathways, so that Brazilian civil society organizations are able to reposition themselves and develop 
new long-term prospects. To this end, we believe that new pathways could be explored in line with the 
directions set out below.
In the first place, a reduction in international philanthropic and/or solidarity funding is considered likely 
to weaken many organizations over the short term; however, over the long term this should be considered 
a real opportunity. As has been mentioned, instead of a shared, long-term political agenda, the agendas of 
partners from the South were often defined by those from the North, leading to a substantial loss of au-
tonomy and little focus on technical information. As evidenced in many countries in the North, a gradual 
reduction in NGO budgets leads to a substantial reorientation of positions and priorities, which in turn 
frequently leads to an innovative (and quite healthy) debate about future prospects. It is clear that “solidarity 
or political funding” is necessary, but this should be derived from sources involving few ties, and could, in the 
near future, come from local sources.
In second place, we find the challenge to connect more horizontally and, therefore, collaboratively, with 
political/activist organizations based in both the North and the South, as well as with international networks. 
The aim is to promote a joint global agenda, supported by a clear division of labour in terms of the issues 
to be addressed in each country, in this case Brazil (in respect of climate change, water, energy, sexual and 
reproductive rights, etc.). This “Global Division for an Activist Agenda” may already be observed in global 
forums such as CIVICUS or the Busan Global Partnership for Effective Development and an Enabling 
Environment, although very few Latin American organizations participate in them. Overloaded agendas 
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mean that NGOs in the South are often absent from such meetings, despite the availability of travel grants. 
Exposure to “transnational advocacy networks” and global partnerships will encourage Brazilian civil society 
actors to recognize that they can play an important and strategic role in an agenda that is post-international 
aid and post-2015.
In third place, it is no longer helpful to write, as researchers tend to in their reports, about “rich-poor”, 
“North-South” and/or “public-private”. Over the last decade, such distinctions have become much more 
specific and subtle, leading to more productive forms of strategic alliance. The last Human Development 
Report (UNDP, 2013) clearly explains how the Global North has grown and expanded into countries 
such as Brazil, India and China, and that the post-2015 agenda will, in large part, be defined by these 
new emerging global powers. Are Brazilian NGOs prepared to participate in this? Do they have a vision 
about how to intervene at government and/or corporate level? The growing Brazilian agenda about Cor-
porate Social Responsibility, for example, came about as a result of the continuous support provided by 
international aid agencies, although it is true that many local organizations still have their doubts about 
the real impact of the long-term practices of transnational companies. Today, a vibrant agenda certainly 
exists – only ten years ago, many believed this to be extinct. Brazilian civil society groups have an impor-
tant role to play, alongside similar foreign organizations, in monitoring the international performance of 
Brazilian corporations. This is a relatively new agenda, in which African NGOs (for example, in Nigeria 
in relation to Shell) as well as Indian ones (in relation to Monsanto), are already constructing highly 
valuable experiences.
In fourth place, the era of international cooperation is no longer dominated by funding flows but 
increasingly by flows of information and knowledge, due to the revolution promoted by the above-men-
tioned ICTs. The future format of cooperation is probably, therefore, one of transnational knowledge 
networks dealing with the generation and sharing of strategic knowledge, rather than one of private 
transnational aid agencies. The interest here, therefore, is not a connection with “aid agencies”, but 
rather with transnational knowledge networks and new forms of research of global relevance and with 
information systems in real time. In this sense, this FGV-Articulação D3 research project selected a 
central topic, which is expected to constitute the beginning of crucial changes to Brazilian international 
cooperation strategies.
Finally, our conclusion is that the conditions and context for international cooperation will change 
dramatically over a generation. Brazil is starting to occupy a leadership position at the G20, yet every-
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thing indicates that Brazilian NGOs are not aware that they also need to readjust their role dramati-
cally. Many opportunities exist, particularly because other Latin American organizations are closely 
watching how Brazilian civil society actors make their choices. Moreover, such choices are highly stra-
tegic, since they revolve around a world in which Brazil will play an increasingly dominant role, a role 
similar to that occupied by Europe when Brazil simply did not exist as a country. This is truly a great 
responsibility.
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